Contributors 

(List of contributors incomplete/subject to change)

  

Topic

Over the last three decades, practical philosophy has increasingly looked at, and become dependent on, the concept of normative reasons for actions and some propositional attitudes.  While there is much controversy surrounding questions concerning the metaphysics, epistemology, and logic of reasons for action and related propositional attitudes, there is some general agreement that many problems in practical philosophy are fruitfully addressed by asking what there is reason to do, desire, or intend. 

Traditionally, in theoretical philosophy, epistemologists have looked to the concept of justification as their central normative notion.  Important debates about whether justification is internal or external, what role justified belief plays in knowledge, and whether justification is context sensitive have, amongst many others, taken centre stage in investigating the nature of epistemic normativity.

During roughly the last decade, there has been a growing movement among philosophers with backgrounds in practical philosophy and epistemology to apply the concept of a reason to the question of what an agent ought and ought not believe.  This work moves away from one of the central and traditional projects in epistemology, that of trying to develop an account of knowledge, and towards the question of when it is correct for an agent to believe something, whether or not the agent does or can know it.  Drawing on resources in the literature on practical reasons and also on traditional literature about justification, philosophers have increasingly become interested in the metaphysics, epistemology, and logic of normative reasons for belief as an alternative (and sometimes competitor) to related issues about justification as the central normative investigative topic in epistemology.

Despite the rapid recent growth in literature on theoretical reasons, there is still no central volume of collected papers that thoroughly explores the state of the art in this topic.  With this volume we aim at providing a comprehensive anthology of papers looking at the metaphysics, epistemology and logic of reasons for belief.  Some of the central issues in the debate that will be explored in the volume include: whether there are pragmatic reasons for belief, papers on the metaphysics and epistemology of reasons for belief, attempts at formalising a logic for reasons for belief, looking at what it is to have or possess a reason for belief, and what the relationship is between reasons for belief and the rationality of belief. 

 

Information

Information about the progress of the volume, including chapter titles, abstracts, and drafts, will become available on this page.

For more information, please contact the editors, Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen